

## The determinants of the choice between IPO and Private Equity in Equity Capital financing for family business: Literature Review And Model

Céline BARREDY et Emmanuel BOUTRON, Associate Professors of Finance

### PURPOSE

- External financing: trade-off between maintaining family control and firm's limited growth (Wu et al., 2007).
- Family business (FB): reluctant to external equity financing (Villalonga and Amit, 2006 ; Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996).
- Equity financing: changes family involvement in ownership and challenges the preservation of Socio-Emotional Wealth (SEW) (Berrone et al. 2012, Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).
- Few papers paid attention to equity financing alternatives in FB, Initial Public Offering (IPO) vs Private Equity (PE): except Wu et al. (2007).



**The paper aims to set a model determining the choice between IPO and PE in equity capital financing in FB.**

### ON-GOING OPERATIONALISATION

- Period : 2011-2014
- Location : European market
- 2 samples :
  - family business that went public
  - family business remaining private and got funds from PE

Variable	Proxy
Production cost of information	Underpricing (deal value compared firm value).
Bargaining power	SEW: questionnaire (Berrone et al. (2012; Zellweger et al. 2012).
Cognitive logic in addition to financial logic	Cognitive resources: questionnaire on strategic and governance change due to the involvement of the new external shareholder(s).

### LITERATURE – HYPOTHESES – PRELIMINARY MODEL

#### Cost of information and choice of IPO vs PE

- The cost of information is linked to the number of investors (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), the less public information on the firm available before the IPO:
  - the greater the cost of producing it
  - the higher the discount required by external investors to participate.
- Cost of diffusing sensible information to competitors that they may take advantage (Maksimovic and Pilcher, 2001).

**H1: The cost of information production has a positive relation to the choice of PE in equity financing in FB.**

#### Bargaining power between family no economic goals and external equity financing alternatives

- Agency Theory : size of the discount at the time of the IPO helps reduce the concentration among new shareholders (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014) → *family bargaining power preserved.*
- Agency Theory Type II (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006)
  - conflict between the family and the PE: controlling vs minority shareholders.
  - family non-economic goals (Schulze et al, 2001; 2003) vs financial expectation of PE (Dawson, 2011; Achleiner et al., 2010; Howorth et al., 2004) → *Family bargaining power challenged.*


**H2: There is a negative relation between the value of socioemotional goals and the choice of PE financing partner.**

#### Financial vs cognitive logics in external financing alternatives

- According to agency theory and Resource Based View (RBV)
- PE provides financial support AND managerial, strategic and monitoring competencies (Wright et al., 2009, Cumming et al. 2007; Beuselinck & Manigart, 2007; Dawson 2011).
  - IPO is centered on financial dynamics.

**H3 : There is a positive link between the choice of PE as a financing partner and the need for cognitive resources in addition to financial resources.**

#### Preliminary Model



### CONTRIBUTIONS



- Exploring financial issues in FB
- Focusing on the heterogeneity of equity financing sources: IPO vs PE
- Equity Financing FB → Agency Cost + RBV = cognitive and financial logics alternatives between IPO & PE.

- Help the family management choosing the best way to equity financing.
- Help external investors family shareholders' choice.

